0630-1630 Sidescan equipment load out, shipping coordination, travel arrangements, Temporary Assigned Duty (TAD), orders, initial mission brief (by phone) by JTF-FA Camp Smith.

1800 Sidescan equipment picked up in Singapore by DHL for transfer to U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.

0855 Sidescan Rep (ETC(SW) Jacobs)) departed Singapore.

0950 Arrived Bangkok, met by JTF-FA Det 1 Driver.

1115 Turned over passport, passport photos, airline tickets and visa application for Vietnam to JTF-FA Det 1 (Bangkok). (Typically the Det Admin Officer retains all documents for deployed personnel to work visas and travel.)

1200 Meeting with Chief Warrant Officer (CWO), of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Five (EODMU-5). Discussed rough concept of ops and compared notes on case file. Identified skill levels and assignments for his team members. Agreement was reached to deploy to the crash site based on witness report, splash a diver and try to confirm witnesses knowledge of the site. If site is not found, will deploy sidescan and find it. If the witness puts us direct on the site, EOD will conduct as many dives as possible for human remains, aircraft identification data and ordnance concerns. After site has been explored, will then deploy sidescan for a complete area search. Regardless of all of the above, the primary mission agreed upon was to find and mark the site for future recovery.

1600 Meeting with JTF-FA Det 1 (Bangkok) Admin Officer and USAF Sgt (Authorizing Officer). Went over some admin basics and confirmed rest of teams arrival times and follow-on meetings. Asked them to procure (4) 12vdc car batteries, a gas driven generator with a 12vdc charge output, gasoline and motor oil.

1830 33rd JTF-FA Team One arrives from Camp Smith, Hawaii.

2000 Meeting between 33rd JTF-FA Team One Leader USMC CWO4, EOD OIC and myself. More basics covered.

1100 Meeting with LtCol (JTF-FA Det One (Bangkok) OIC)). Basic brief on Bangkok do’s and don’ts. Rough schedule laid out for deployment to U-taphao.

0700 Foot locker and equipment load out from Hotel in Bangkok for transfer by truck to U-taphao.

1600 The Main Brief: Team Leader, Assistant Team Leader (USMC GySgt), EOD CWO, EOD Divers and me. At this time all timetables, plans and standards of conduct were laid out in detail. Some specifics discussed included:

Reports: During sidescan and dive ops reports will be passed via radio from the dive site to a beach Det. The beach Det will report to Camp Smith in Hawaii (usually via JTF-FA Det 2 (Hanoi). Hawaii will contact CLWP via landline and provide a daily report. Phone numbers for my boss the 7^th Fleet Diving & Salvage Officer, CLWP Staff Duty Officer and secure and unsecure FAX numbers were provided.

Comm Plan: The workboat will be provided with a HF transceiver. The distance between the boat and the beach Det is approximately 60 miles. A comm check will be conducted at 0630, 1230, 1730 and 2000 daily. The beach Det radio will be manned 24 hours per day. The radio on the boat will be kept off to conserve power if unable to run off of 12vdc car batteries. A trickle charge for a spare battery will be maintained by a solar panel charger at all times. A wire whip antenna will provided which should be pointed towards the beach Det at a 45° angle over the water.

Diver Evac: During dive ops the C-130 and helo crews supporting the 33rd JTF-FA will be on standby for immediate evac. In event of an accident the boat will call the beach Det who will then call in a helo. An evac will be set up at the nearest possible landfall landing zone ashore. The helo will transport any injured personnel to Ho Chi Minh airport for pickup by the C-130. The C-130 will pressurize to 1 atmosphere for a return flight to U-Taphao, Thailand. A land transfer will then be arranged to Sattahip Naval Base for chamber support. The hope is that this can be accomplished in less than 12 hours. A 1400 cutoff for dive ops will be imposed to allow for sufficient daylight to get the C-130 into Vietnam.

Standards of Conduct / Fraternization: There is a zero fraternization policy for U.S. Service members with any Vietnamese Nationals. Any incidents will be reported to JTF-FA Camp Smith and will then be fed back down the chain of command. Buddy system in effect at all times, curfew set at 2130, interpreters required whenever ashore.

Health Issues: Any health problems should be reported to team medics ASAP for immediate treatment and resolution. Typical afflictions are diarrhea and pink eye. Consumption of local water is not authorized. Handling of animals (rabies) is also not authorized. Consumption of cooked leafy green vegetables is recommended as milk is not pasteurized and should not be consumed.

Drivers: When in Vietnam assume all drivers and other Vietnamese counterparts understand English. Most are typically Officers in the Vietnamese military.

0800-1200 EOD OIC and I moved to Embassy to start working logistics and getting dive gear and sidescan system out of Thai customs. After considerable confusion whether or not the system ever left Singapore, it was located in Bangkok Customs warehouse. Based on the fact that gear will be held up in customs, and that translation of equipment inventories is ongoing in Vietnam, and, IAW coordination between Det 1 OIC in Bangkok, Det 2 OIC in Hanoi and JTF-FA Camp Smith, deployment of the EOD and sidescan missions will be delayed until approximately Tuesday 10Jan95. Agreement was reached to keep the EOD/Sidescan Team together and to not send EOD in alone.

1000 Entire 33rd JFA deployed to U-taphao with the exception of EOD OIC and myself.

1200-1700 EOD OIC and I worked customs and shipping concerns at the Bangkok airport. A tax and fee of US$1,300.00 was assessed for the dive gear alone to break it out of customs immediately. As far as the sidescan system, a similar fee would have to be paid for immediate shipment. We chose not to expedite either shipments and instead referred the issue to the Embassy Customs Officer.

1800 JTF-FA Det 1 (Bangkok) notified U-taphao OIC to not load EOD equipment onto C-130’s during Wednesday scheduled palletizing and aircraft loading. Also Team One and EOD were told to not board the C-130 for transfer to Vietnam on Thursday, but instead should wait for entire team to regroup and go into Vietnam together.

1900 LtCol (Det 2 Hanoi OIC) arrives in Bangkok from Hanoi.

2000 Meeting with Det 2 Hanoi OIC , more do’s and don’ts for Vietnam.

0700 Equipment palletizing and load out in C-130’s in U-taphao.

0800-1700 Embassy Customs worked getting all gear out of Thai Customs. At the same time the Embassy continued to work on visas for EOD/Sidescan Team.

2130 Got word that gear would be freed up at customs early tomorrow morning.

0400 Team Two departs Thailand for Vietnam.

0930 Checked out of hotel in Bangkok, departed for Bangkok airport to take custody of equipment.

1105-1400 Arrived airport, physically sighted equipment. Worked with customs in obtaining and loading equipment.

1400 Departed Bangkok for Pattaya with equipment.

1720 Arrived Pattaya, offloaded all EOD and sidescan equipment and stored in hotel secure storage. Equipment requested (generator and batteries) already purchased.

1800 Team One completely reassembled. Team consists of two elements; RE2 and IE2. RE2 is a recovery element which is going in to recover remains for a case(s) which has/have already been investigated. IE2 is an investigation element which is going in to investigate and analyze a number of cases in south Vietnam, two of which are the B-52 sites in 30 meters of water, approximately 60 miles off of Vung Tau. Both the EOD and sidescan teams are components of IE2.

0645 Reloaded equipment, departed Pattaya for U-taphao Air Base.

0800 Arrived U-taphao. Offloaded equipment and built pallet for C-130. Did a thorough inspection of the sidescan cable, the bail grip at the shackle end was bird caged and frayed. The insulation where the cable enters the shackle is torn away. Will not know if cable is down until a system operational test is performed.

1600 Passports arrive from Bangkok with visas for Vietnam.

2200 Curfew in Pattaya for Team One.

0800 Started on daily doxycycline by IE2 Team Medic.

0900 Checked out of hotel, loaded buses, departed Pattaya for U-taphao.

0940 Arrived U-taphao.

1030 Boarded C-130, engine start.

1100 Engine breakdown, deplaned.

1215 Reboarded, engine restart.

1230 Engine breakdown, deplaned.

1445 Reboarded, engine restart.

1450 Departed U-taphao for Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.

1615 Arrived Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.

1630 Offloaded C-130 onto trucks, by hand.

1630-1730 Cleared customs and immigration.

1750 RE2 and IE2 split up and went to separate hotels.

1800 Checked into hotel in Ho Chi Minh City.

1900 Team meeting, safety, curfew and buddy system gouge reiterated. Tomorrow’s POD put out.

0800 Checked out of hotel, departed Ho Chi Minh City.

0800-1740 Land transport from Ho Chi Minh City to Rach Gia

1740 Arrived Rach Gia, checked into hotel.

1800 Evening brief, laid out POD for first case tomorrow.

2030 Equipment arrives, offloaded foot lockers, sidescan system was left on truck overnight under locked and manned watch.

Comments: Nearly nine hours of driving. The last half of the ride was over poor, unpaved, dusty road conditions. Hotel had A/C, hot water, laundry service, no long distance phones or food service. Now that IE2 is apart from the rest of the JFA the components of the team are clearing up. IE2 is roughly made up of:

1 USMC CWO4 (Team Leader)

1 USA Captain (Ranger/SF)

1 USN CWO3 (EOD OIC)

1 USN HMCS(DV) (Team medic, IDC/DMT and 4th Diver (Unqual’d))

1 USN ETC(SW) (Sidescan operator/technician)

1 USMC GYSGT (Team NCO OIC/Asst Team Leader, runs the team day to day operations)

2 USN EOD Techs

1 USAF EOD Tech

4 USAF Linguists/Analysts (Case studies)

2 USA Remains and Recovery specialists (CILHI: Central Identification Lab, Hawaii)

4 VNOSMP Officials (Vietnamese National Office for Searches of Missing Persons)

0730 Morning brief, meeting between Team, VNOSMP and local province officials. IE2 deployed to case site, EOD/Sidescan teams remain behind.

0800-1200 Equipment check out, did PMS on sidescan, performed a complete system hook up and test with satisfactory results. Initially the recorder did not work, troubleshot the problem down to a loose helix drive printed circuit board. The board must have come loose during the rough drive. The only remaining optest is to put the system in the water and ensure there’s no leak by where the cable insulation is torn/missing. Charged all 12vdc batteries and ran generator for optest.

1230 Reloaded system back into truck.

1400-1800 Assisted IE2 comm operator with problems. The IE uses a 50watt HF transceiver with a number of antenna configurations to talk to Det 2 (Hanoi). Upon installation the system did not work. Checked out all connections, radio settings, metered out all cables, checked battery voltage, still no comms. Based on reception of local radio and the fact that the power meter showed good power out suspect equipment good and no comms due to propagation.

1830 Sick call with IE2 Medic. Sore throat, runny nose, diagnosis; allergic reaction.

1900 Evening brief: IE2 returned from case site with no new leads, information or remains. Personnel interviewed had no direct knowledge about the case.

1915 Reloaded foot lockers and comm gear.

0800 Checked out of hotel, departed Rach Gia.

0800-1640 Land transport from Rach Gia to Ca Mau, Minh Hai.

1640 Arrived Ca Mau, checked into hotel.

1700 Evening brief, laid out POD for next case tomorrow.

0730 IE2 (minus Team Leader) deployed to case site, EOD went along since case is over water. Sidescan Rep stayed behind.

0840 Team Leader, EOD OIC and I went over a detailed concept of ops for the diving and sidescan missions. A SITREP was written which spelled out the plan.

1000 Continued working on down comms, tried alternate antenna configurations from the roof of the hotel. Same symptoms, still no joy.

1300 Spoke with Det 2 (Hanoi) Commo (USN RMC) on landline about down comms. Reported all steps taken to date. Agreed that equipment was good and that problem is most likely poor propagation due to vertical/horizontal polarization of antennas. Commo stated that 1600-1730 would most likely be the best time of the day to establish comms.

1600 Attempted to establish comms with Det 2 (Hanoi) again, no joy.

0700 Reloaded foot lockers and comm gear.

0730 Team photo with local province officials and VNOSMP, collared shirts and slacks.

0800 Checked out of hotel, departed Ca Mau, Minh Hai.

0800-110 Land transport from Ca Mau to Soc Trang.

1100 Arrived Soc Trang, checked into hotel.

1600 Worked with Team Leader and EOD to develop plan on splitting up IE2 to work the B-52 cases. The basic plan is as follows: IE2 will move to Ho Chi Minh City. A team consisting of the Asst Team Leader, EOD, Sidescan Rep, Medic, Linguist and a case analyst will deploy to Vung Tau. This team will check into a hotel and establish a beach det as close to the water as possible and establish comms first with Det 2 in Hanoi. A second radio will be installed on the workboat for comms between the boat and beach det. (Hanoi Det Commo will meet team in Vung Tau to assist with comms which haven’t worked to date). From the hotel the EOD/Sidescan team will prep the workboat and then get underway with the medic and a linguist. The Asst Team Leader and case analyst will man the det and monitor comms 24 hours a day.

2000 Team member (Linguist/Analyst) was down hard with a fever and diarrhea. Team Medic treated with IV’s, antibiotics and rest.

2100 Team got word the local authorities were keeping a close eye on our movements around town (restaurant and market). All team members were required to fill out provincial registration forms. Local police were spotted leafing through team passports held by hotel.

0800 IE2 deploys to case site. EOD/Sidescan team remained behind to configure trucks for split ops to dive site and to monitor SIQ member. Put all of IE2 equipment on one truck with 20 cases of water. Configured the second truck with EOD/Sidescan equipment and 30 cases of water.

1300 EOD/Sidescan team reviewed entire case file of B-52 wreck. Last known location of aircraft (based on radar contact time of accident) and previous IE2 reports (1994 Trimble GPS reading at site as identified by witness) were programmed into a Rockwell GPS. GPS then figured difference in distance at approximately 7.6 miles. Last known contact and witness report do not correlate with the aircraft direction of travel (North). Discrepancy could be a result of the collision which may have spun aircraft around into an opposite spiral from 32,000 feet.

1400 IE2 returns from case site, no joy.

1500 Meeting, decision made to check out in one hour and travel to next site. This will allow the I.E. to work the case tomorrow and save one day of travel time.

1540 Checked out of hotel, departed Soc Trang.

1540-1715 Land transport from Soc Trang to Can Tho.

1715 Arrived Can Tho, checked into hotel.

1730 Meeting, more planning, VNOSMP Team Leader went ahead to Vung Tau to start greasing the skids for the dive and sidescan ops. Report is that Det 2 (Hanoi) is taking a lot of heat from JTF-FA Camp Smith on why we are not in the water yet. Window for boat ops remains 17-23Jan.

0725 Two more team members SIQ, fever and diarrhea. Team Medic treated with antibiotics and rest. Previous SIQ back on his feet. Doc trying to figure out if any common cause.

0730 Meeting on today’s case. Sidescan Rep departed hotel via van with IE2 to boat landing.

0930 Arrived boat landing, departed via small boat for Committee House in Ke Sach.

1020 Arrived Ke Sach, witness interviews (including man who shot down helo), photos with local officials.

1130 Depart to 1st crash site via small boat, 500 meter hike to site in rice paddy. No evidence at site, nearby resident produced helo parts.

1200 Depart to 2nd crash site via small boat, 750 meter hike to site in rice paddy. Large impact crater at site, gasket and wire found on ground.

1230 Depart to 3rd site via small boat, (last known location (LKL)), 500 meter hike. Used GPS and waypoint, GPS led team right to LKL, another rice paddy. No evidence, canvassed local residents, no info on crash.

1310 Wrap up, back to Committee House, depart for boat landing.

1435 Depart boat landing via van.

1450 Lead vehicle breakdown, squeezed two van loads into one, continued on.

1525 Arrived hotel, meeting and debrief.

0500 A five man I.E. checked out and departed for a case site.

0900 Checked out of hotel, 10 man team departed Can Tho.

0900-1315 Land transport from Can Tho to Tan An, Long An.

1315 Arrived Tan An, Long An, checked into hotel.

1400 Installed comm antennas on roof.

1600 Five man team arrives, full team again.

1800 Meeting, went over plan of the day for tomorrow. Got word there may be Vietnamese divers going down same time as EOD. EOD OIC said no problem as they will set up different dive stations. Also got the word that the window for diving and sidescan is limited to 48 hours only, a one shot deal. The VNOSMP is still in Vung Tau negotiating.

1830 Dinner, team getting tired of the travel and food problems!

2000 Another meeting to go over diver evac and a detailed schedule of events. Team Leader got the word today that he will go out in the boat. This changed the manning a little bit.

0600 Reloaded trucks.

0730 Six man team departs for cases near Ho Chi Minh City.

0800 Checked out of hotel, 9 man team departs for Vung Tau via Ho Chi Minh City.

0950 Arrived Ho Chi Minh City Foreign Affairs office to pick up spare radio.

1055 Depart Ho Chi Minh City for Vung Tau.

1345 Arrived Vung Tau, checked into hotel.

1400 Province meeting: Discussed the following with local officials;

1. Apparently the Province Officials and the VNOSMP recommended to the JTF-FA during recent tech talks to conduct the over water case in April due to poor seasonal weather in January. The JTF-FA however ignored this and pressed for January.

2. The officials provided a brochure of the boat which will be used. It is approximately 150 feet long and is a diving and salvage platform. The boat is owned by VISAL (Vietnam Salvage Incorporated), a full service salvage corporation with an office and capability based in Vung Tau.

3. A waiver letter stating the local officials had no responsibilty for personnel or equipment safety was produced for the Team Leader to sign.

1600 Shopping for supplies for boat.

2100 Filled sandbags for buoy clumps.

2200 Last meeting before underway tomorrow. Went over diver evac plan again, laid out a plan of the day for tomorrow.

0400 Revilee.

0430 Checked out of hotel, departed for port of Vung Tau.

0600-0700 Load out of EOD/Sidescan gear onto boat. Crew very helpful, used crane and cargo slings to get gear onboard.

0730 Underway enroute case site. Province Officials, VNOSMP, Mr. Quit (Case witness), and U.S. Team onboard.

1100 Diver emergency and evac plan walk-thru once again. Assignments for emergency plan laid out.

1300 Sidescan set up and ready, satisfactory optest. Weather slightly worse, sea state 3-4, wind 4-5.

1400 Still enroute, safe dive window expires for today. (1400 cut off based on getting diver evac aircraft in while daylight).

1447 Beginning of only sidescan window. Weather same, water on entire fantail, no non-skid, mostly grease covered wood. Deployed sidescan, rough conditions, divers had to throw the towfish off of fantail. Entire stern is completely open to the sea with no gunnel. The stern is configured with only roller bars for tow cables. One good wave and people are going over the stern.

1500 Sidescan towfish taking a pounding, trying to get it to the bottom. Difficult to discern between bottom and surface returns. Recording shows severe heave being transmitted from the ship to the towfish.

1510 Towfish takes a steep dive for the bottom, one meter from a crash. Asked ship driver to speed up, took two minutes to get a response. (Linguist on fantail handling cable). Ship has no indication of speed in knots.

1515 Comms with beach det lost. Radio hit by wave.

1520 Told fantail to take cable to capstan, four people unable to hold or tend cable by hand.

1530 Fish continues to "fly" erratically due to heaving. Surface return still rough, bottom return discernible, bottom appears to be featureless sand. More near crashes. Cable severely kinked on capstan. Speed 4-6 knots to keep towfish from crashing and to maintain steerage way.

1545 Sidescan down, operator received electrical shocked from equipment case. Trigger light intermittent between steady on and steady off indicating both a short and an open in the tow cable.

1600 Towfish back on deck. Tow cable is severed at shackle housing, paint was taken off the front of the K-Wing depressor, strain relief and bail grip are bird-caged. Getting the towfish back on deck was accomplished under dangerous conditions. Three men were required to work the very edge of the stern, no life jackets or safety lines. If it were not for the safety line attached to the tail of the towfish, and the strain relief leading to the shackle, the towfish would have been lost.

1605 Spoke with Team Leader, advised him that I felt we were operating unsafely and that all personnel topside working the fantail should have life jackets and tending lines.

1700 Comms established with Det 2 (Hanoi) via ship’s HF.

Comments: Sidescan Rep made the call to deploy the sidescan despite the weather as I felt today may be the only window of opportunity for the entire JFA.

Secondly, the search was going to center around the position that the witness led the 28th JFA to. This is the posit where in 1994 the 28th JFA took a Trimble GPS reading at the position identified by the witness. A second posit exists which is the last known location of the aircraft. During today’s underway the witness came up with a third "mystery" posit.

0500 Revilee, sea state 4-5, wind state 5-6.

0740 Sea state upgraded to 6.

0745 Decision time, ship’s Master stated that the best time to dive is in April. When asked if his divers would dive today he said no. The bow is crashing up and down, could crush any divers trying to get back onboard.

0940 Team Leader called Hanoi, they are awaiting authorization from Hawaii to cancel today’s op due to weather.

1000 Op canceled, underway for Vung Tau.

1100 Meeting with Team Leader about options for repair of cable.

1630 Return to port.

1. The weather was too rough for both sidescan and diving. The heaving transmitted from the ship down the cable tore up the tow cable and took paint off of the K-Wing depressor. Conditions are recorded on sidescan trace.

2. All local Vietnamese personnel involved feel we are crazy for going out at this time of the season. They stated that April is the best time weather-wise.

3. The VNOSMP told the JTF-FA personnel during recent tech talks that April would offer the best weather for over water ops.

4. The weather forecast has the seas worsening tomorrow, follow on reports unavailable at this time.

5. Repair of the cable will take 48 hours which will provide only 80% curing of the strain relief compound.

6. Sidescan operator was told window of opportunity was 48 hours so elected to throw the fish in after the dive window expired. The water portion of this mission was never a go until the last minute.

7. If we use the spare parts to fix the cable on hand, we have no parts to fix the electric cable winch in Singapore. If the field repair fails again then there will be no sidescan capability in WESTPAC until parts are received and repaired.

8. Witness knowledge of exact posit unreliable. (Sidescan Rep’s opinion)

9. Unsure of what posit to work off of, this is expanding the box.

10. Poor comms with ship driver, language barrier.

11. Next plan is for ship half the size.

12. Decision to go/no go being made in Hanoi and Hawaii.

0730 Got word to repair tow cable.

0745 Started re-termination of tow cable.

2030 Retermination completed.

0700 Meeting with Team Leader. Leader and EOD OIC will go boat shopping today and try to contract for a boat big enough ($1,000.00 limit) for both EOD and sidescan operations. Leaders orders from Hanoi were to get a boat and underwater video system ASAP and continue operations. Again, I advised the Team Leader that under the same or worse weather conditions, we may tear up the towfish or tow cable. He acknowledged that and stated that "if we ruin the fish or cable JTF will buy a new one".

1100 Team Leader returns, biggest boat available is approximately 65’ with a working area of about 8’ x 4’. Quick check of the weather from the hotel shows weather to be the same or worse than the second day at sea.

1400 Team meeting with boat owner. Owner refuses to let boat captain take boat out due to rough weather. (Note: Vung Tau full of boats due to weather)

2130 Dinner meeting between Team Leader, EOD personnel and VISAL managers and dive supervisors. Leader and divers used opportunity to try and loosen up VISAL personnel for contracting of boat and equipment.

0900 Team Leader met with VISAL again to try and get them to drop their price for rent of a Zodiac, underwater video camera and fish finder.

0930 Called CLWP, provided update. Advised the system was repaired, retermination 80% cured, wouldn’t know if it was going to work unless I threw it back in the water.

1000 Meeting between Team Leader, EOD OIC and I. EOD and I provided recommendations to Leader on whether we could safely go back to sea in the 65’ boat negotiated for. EOD said no and provided reasons. I also said no for the following reasons:

1. There is not enough room to work with the tow cable. The possibility of a tender getting caught in the bite of the cable is considerable.

2. There is no capstan aboard, the cable would have to be payed out and retrieved by hand. Under normal sea conditions this is workable with 4 tenders, with enough work area. Under conditions experienced Tuesday, 4 tenders were not able to retrieve the towfish.

3. There is zero protection from the sea or sun for all personnel with the exception of the sidescan operator. This would be acceptable for a short term survey but not multiple days.

4. The boat is too small for the weather conditions as they exist and are projected. The Leader has a current weather forecast which calls for 15-20kt winds and 7-10’ seas.

5. Under the same conditions we may damage the tow cable since the termination is not 100% cured.

1200 Inspected the proposed 65’ boat, won’t do due to work space and configuration.

1330-1430 Tour of VISAL headquarters. EOD personnel inspected their underwater video system (Sony camcorder with an underwater housing) and their Zodiac (brand new still in the box). They still won’t budge on their price. Team Leader inquired as to whether the video system would be available for rent if a JFA returned in April.

1500 Appears that all options/practical reasons for getting underway again have been exhausted. Last chance will be tomorrow morning.

1545 Team meeting, got word we’re going back out on the same VISAL ship tomorrow morning. Team discussed logistics and plans for tomorrow, went over lessons learned from the first time out.

0700 Removed repaired termination from the vise and set up spool for safe transport. Total curing time in the vise was 58 hours vice the 168 recommended. Potting compound still tacky to the touch.

0800 Reloaded truck with cable, supplies, water and foot lockers.

1000 Asst Team Leader arrives from Ho Chi Minh City. Went over demobilization plan with him. Advised him I wanted the sidescan gear to be routed through Bangkok and onto DHL for expeditious return to Singapore.

1100 Checked out and departed hotel.

1300 Equipment load out onto VISAL ship.

1315 Sidescan recorder dropped two feet onto deck of ship by ship’s crew manning the crane. Recorder still in shipping container, landed on it’s face side.

1410 Hooked up recorder, inoperative. Voltage indication low on known good 24vdc batteries, scale lines uneven. Troubleshooting in progress.

1515 Recorder back up, reseated 24vdc assembly and swapped out Trigger/Scale/Event Board, retuned.

1820 Dive stations set. Sidescan systems up and running, repairs to termination appear to be holding. Started scanning box centered around witness posit from 28th JFA.

2345 Completed box, team reviewed traces. Sidescan operator recommended doing dives on contact closest to witnesses posit although a later contact is much larger. Team Leader disagreed and chose to dive tomorrow on largest contact.

0030 Ship anchored near most significant posit.

0530 Revilee. Reviewed last night’s data, refigured location using ship GPS posit, horizontal offset and best guess on layback (distance from GPS unit to towfish). Loaded recomputed posit into GPS for use in Zodiac.

0600 Checked on termination after approximately 6 hours of scanning last night. There are gouges in the potting compound and it appears some of the potting is peeling away under the tow strain. Will monitor, if it gives way there’s no way to repair and sidescan mission will be terminated.

0640 Deployed Zodiac, reaquired most significant posit from last night using GPS.

0700 1st Diver down on M-46 posit N 09° 37’ 07.06" / E 107° 02’ 45.15".

0719 Diver up, 98’ for 19, 15’ visibility, nothing found, sand bottom, no coral or other features resembling sidescan recording, diver searched north of posit.

0736 2nd Diver down on M-46 posit N 09° 37’ 07.06" / E 107° 02’ 45.15".

0757 Diver up, 98’ for 19, 20’ visibility down, 40’ visibility to the sides, nothing found, sand bottom, no coral or other features resembling sidescan recording, diver searched south of posit.

0800 Meeting back on ship, EOD will splash 3rd and last diver back on posit and search east, if nothing found may splash Vietnamese divers, then sidescan again.

0817 3rd Diver down on M-46 posit N 09° 37’ 07.06" / E 107° 02’ 45.15".

0835 Diver up, 95’ for 18, 20’ visibility down, 40’ visibility to the sides, nothing found, sand bottom, no coral or other features resembling sidescan recording, diver searched east of posit

0845 Meeting, Team Leader wants to complete sidescan survey of 1st box, then start the 2nd box. After sufficient surface interval for divers, will halt sidescan survey for dive ops. After dive ops will continue survey. Sidescan Rep advised that we never dove west of the M-46 posit.

0900 Commenced sidescan survey.

1330 Halted sidescan survey for 2nd set of dives. First box completed, no significant sonar contacts.

1400 Deployed Zodiac. Safety Note: 1400 was the agreed cut off for any dive ops due to required daylight left for a diver evac.

1600 Two more dives completed, same results.

1640 Underway for next box.

1738 Ready to sidescan, system check out on deck OK.

1750 Tow cable twisted from towfish end to remove kinks.

1800 Towfish deployed, sidescan port channel inop. Suspect cable kink or fault in towfish trigger board or transducer.

1810 Towfish back on deck. Chose not to open fish and break watertight seals to electronics package in nose. Instead will cut search box in half closest to center of box and scan with one channel.

1820 EOD OIC and EN2 Flinchbaugh start refiguring navigation plan for new search pattern. Waypoints being loaded into GPS.

1900-2400 Search of half mile box.

0100 Half mile box search completed.

0600 Figured layback and offsets for last nights significant contacts. Set dive stations.

0840 Two dives completed in a 100 yard box around figured posit of last night’s most significant contact. Nothing found. Sea state worsening. End window for sidescan or dive ops.

0900 Zodiac reloaded. Enroute Vung Tau.

0900-1500 Fresh water washdown and securing of all equipment.

1550 Moored Vung Tau Port Authority.

1610 Moved all gear ashore. Port personnel would not allow trucks to enter this area of pier.

1630 Moved all gear back onto ship.

1635 Underway for spot outboard another ship 200 yards down the pier.

1645 Moored (again). Moved all gear onto pier and into trucks.

1710 Departed Vung Tau.

2010 Arrived Ho Chi Minh City, checked into hotel.

0750 Called CLWP, Lcdr Keenan, provided update. Discussed option to move sidescan gear onto USS Brunswick which would be in Sattahip, Thailand.

1030 IE2 departs for airport and flies out commercial to Bangkok. EOD and Sidescan Rep remain behind to accompany gear on C-130 mission.

1230 Checked out, departed hotel.

1315 Arrived airport, hurry up and wait. Rejoined with other IE and RE teams.

1615 C-130 arrives late. Cleared customs and immigration.

1620 Load buses for ride to aircraft.

1630 Move off buses back to terminal. Immigration snag.

1710 Back on the bus.

1715-1820 Load and palletize 6 trucks of equipment onto C-130.

1845 Departed Vietnam.

2023 Arrived Bangkok, Thailand.

2035 Offloaded C-130 of personal gear bound for Bangkok.

2120 Departed Bangkok.

2150 Arrived U-taphao Air Base.

2200 Departed U-taphao.

0900 Departed Pattaya.

0940 Arrived U-taphao.

1000-1300 C-130 offloaded.

1300 Departed U-taphao with sidescan sonar system.

1320 Arrived Sattahip Naval Base, loaded sidescan system onto USS Brunswick for transfer to Singapore.

1330-1500 Briefed USS Brunswick Commanding Officer and Seventh Fleet Diving & Salvage Officer on sidescan and dive op portions of the 33rd JFA mission.

1510 Departed Sattahip.

1525 Arrived U-taphao.

1800 Departed U-taphao.

1200 Checked out, departed Pattaya.

0840 Checked out of hotel, departed hotel for airport.

0920 Arrived airport.

1150 Departed Bangkok.

1438 Arrived Singapore

1515 Return to residence, mission complete.

Sidescan Operator’s Conclusions / Recommendations:

Sidescan search was not an accurate search from which you could draw a debris field. However, the search did complete part of it’s primary mission of identifying that there is something other than sand near the location reported by the witness. It is my opinion that the contacts we hit, mainly M7, M13 and M46 do not belong on the featureless, sandy bottom we encountered. They are worthy of reinvestigation.

GPS posits for the sidescan contacts of significant interest are as follows:

M-7 - N 09° 36’ 937" / E 107° 03’ 220" 22Jan @ 2037, Biggest contact, did 3 dives, all of posit covered but west of posit, neg results.

M-13 - N 09° 37’ 05" / E 107° 03’ 16" 22Jan @ 2312 Decent hit, no dives

M-46 - N 09° 37’ 24.62" / E 106° 58’ 41.50" 23Jan @ 2148 Good contact , did dives, neg results

Other sidescan contacts of interest:

M-10 - N 09° 37’ 07" / E 107° 03’ 08" 22Jan @ 2223 Decent hit, no dives

M-12 - N 09° 37’ 22" / E 107° 03’ 16" 22Jan @ 2308 Decent hit, no dives

Other posits of interest:

Last known location - N 09° 43’ 57" / E 106° 58’ 58"

Witness (Mr Quit) posit from 28th JFA - N 09° 37’ 21.1" / E 106° 58’ 44.5"

Follow-on mission: If we go in again without the ATS, a team consisting of 1 or 2 sidescan operators (2 for 24 hour searches) and a dedicated navigation team (2 Quartermasters) would be required to first, conduct the search in it’s entirety and then record the debris field during post survey processing. A bottom profile to include any debris fields could then be constructed and contacts can be prioritized for dive ops. The plan would be to nail down the center of the box, encompassing all sidescan contacts from the 33rd JFA, posits provided from the 28th JFA and the last known location. From this we develop a box big enough to contain all posits. The navigation team can then develop a 100 meter lane search grid. (Most hand held GPS units can not store enough waypoints for this big a search. The AN/WRN-6 installed on ATS ships can hold approximately 200 points). With the proper advance planning the sidescan/navigation team can deploy to the case with the grid and charts programmed and charted. In addition, COMLOG WESTPAC has immediate access to a computer driven GPS and search system developed by NAVOCEANO based in Singapore. This system can be configured and loaded in Singapore. Upon installation aboard the search vessel it gives ship drivers a visual display of search grids and lanes.

Navigation shortfalls: Regardless of the outcome of the 33rd JFA, mention should be made of the outstanding job by EODMU-5 Petty Officer as the sidescan team navigator. Despite his super performance, the following reasons account for the teams inability to reaquire the sonar contacts during dive ops.

1) Lack of a dedicated navigation team to plot a "to scale" debris field.

2) The inability of the tow vessel to stay on course due to heavy winds. A minimum speed of 5-6 knots was required to maintain steerage way. Ideal tow speed would have been 3 knots. The excessive speed compresses sidescan sonar contacts thereby reducing the resolution and size of the recorded image.

3) The boxes and lanes searched were not completed with 100% accuracy due to the ship having to steer off course for fishing vessels and due to sidescan equipment failures. (Sidescan port channel went down for 6 hours of searching reducing the 2nd box from one square mile to 1/2 square mile).

4) There was insufficient time to conduct a big enough search to encompass all posits of interest and to reaquire and prosecute the contacts recorded. The key to sidescan is to make numerous passes from different angles over targets of interest. During this phase you can decrease your range setting thereby "blowing up" the images for better interpretation. This was not accomplished because insufficient time was allocated for the mission.

5) The language barrier between the team and the VISAL crew came into effect a couple times. They failed to adjust speed at times and made both speed and course changes without warning, taking us out of our lanes. (This would be eliminated through use of the NAVOCEANO search system).

Logistics / TAD Issues: Considering the tremendous logistics and planning involved, the JTF-FA personnel involved performed tremendously under unfavorable and constantly changing conditions. The IE2 Team Leader and Assistant Team Leader made maximum utilization of the people, time and equipment involved. The cases worked were scheduled in such a fashion as to minimize travel and dead time. However, the fact that the EOD/Sidescan Team was deployed for 29 days for four days of actual work is not the most efficient use of their assets. The IE’s hands were tied on this issue for numerous reasons. All considered, future sidescan and dive ops should be lumped together to get maximum use of time for deployed personal. In simple terms, over water ops need to be a separate JFA by itself, manned by the proper team and not tied to any land cases.

Sidescan Casualty: The casualty to the sidescan tow cable was a combination of two things:

1) Mishandling of the cable in Bangkok customs and associated shipping which gouged the outer insulation where the cable enters the termination housing.

2) Severe strain associated with the towing operation (sea state 4-5) which was transmitted from the heaving of the ship to the termination housing. This strain eventually damaged the already torn outer cable jacket. Under normal circumstances we would not have deployed the system in anything more than sea state 2-3.

Safety: The first time underway we were entirely unsafe. Considering the sea state everyone topside should have had life jackets on anytime they went pass the 1st towbar. A safety line should have been rigged across the stern and personnel deploying the towfish should have had personnel safety lines. The second time out was much better, especially the first night. The second night we let our guard down again and we’re working the edge with no flotation devices. Of course the weather was much better.

Diver Evac: The diver evac plan fortunately did not have to be used. My personal opinion is that it was a shaky plan and may not have been doable in a 12 hour window. Given communications outages, ship steam time to landfall, language differences, customs and immigration and so on, I would not want to be a bent diver this far from a chamber.

Tasking: As far as logistics, 24 hour notice is not the way to do business. With more warning COMLOG WESTPAC would have completed repairs to the sidescan electric winch. Bringing the winch on the job not only eliminates having to handle the tow cable by hand, but also gives you a second cable on-site. The spool we used then becomes a backup.

Bottom Line: (My opinion, not necessarily COMLOG WESTPAC!!!)

Three options:

1) Deploy to Vung Tau, send the witness out in his boat to find the site. When he finds it have him buoy it, then send in the dive/sidescan teams. If he puts us over the site, give him his $15,000.00.

2) Go back with a small dedicated team as mentioned above using the NAVOCEANO system. Allocate the resources and time to conduct a thorough search under better weather conditions.

3) Bring in an ATS. This eliminates among many things, the logistics of shipping equipment into and out of Thailand and Vietnam, and the need for deploying personnel in country. You also reduce all logistics required (fuel, water, food, generators, compressors, medical supplies, ETC...) to near nothing. You’ll have a chamber on-site, > 20 divers, a fine-tuned bridge-CIC navigation team, and be able to conduct a thorough, once and for all investigation and possible recovery.